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Expungement and the Rehabilitation of New Jersey’s Offenders: How the In re 
Expungement Petition of J.S. Court Got it Wrong 
Lauren Sharp 
I. Introduction 
In 2015, the New Jersey Supreme Court narrowed the interpretation of the New Jersey 
statute relating to expungement of criminal records.1  Expungement is defined as the “extraction 
and isolation of all records on file within any court, detention or correctional facility, law 
enforcement or criminal justice agency concerning a person’s detection, apprehension, arrest, 
detention, trial or disposition of an offense within the criminal justice system.”2 The 
expungement statute has been narrowly interpreted “to preclude expungement when the 
petitioner has been convicted of multiple crimes even when those crimes occurred within a short 
span of time” in the decision of In re Expungement Petition of J.S.3 Justice LaVecchia authored 
the dissenting opinion and argued that the majority’s interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) was 
“too restrictive given … [the] statute’s remedial purpose.”4  While in both the majority opinion 
and the dissenting opinion expungement is stated to be a remedial device, the majority’s narrow 
interpretation of the expungement statute does not allow the statute to reach its full rehabilitative 
purpose. 
In the opinion of the author of this note, the majority wrongly defined the word “crime” 
as containing only one offense. The New Jersey Supreme Court had to decide whether or not 
offenders who plead guilty to multiple offenses that were committed in a short period of time 
                                                        
1 In re Expungement Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. 54 (2015).  
2 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-1 
3 In re Expungement Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. 54 (2015) [hereinafter “Petition of J.S.”]. 
4 Id. at 78 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting). 
 2 
could be entitled to expungement of their criminal record.5  The majority chose to define crime 
narrowly as constituting only one offense. This narrow definition lead the majority to deny the 
expungement petitions of two men who committed multiple offenses in a short period of time 
and to rule that only offenders who had committed crimes during a “single, uninterrupted event” 
could apply for expungement of their criminal records.6 In view of the remedial nature of 
expungement and the definition of crime, the majority should have ruled in favor of the 
expungement petitions of J.S. and G.P.B. 
In Part II of this Note the relevant New Jersey expungement statutes and Petition of J.S. 
will be examined.7  In Part III the leading cases in expungement up until Petition of J.S. will be 
analyzed.8  Part IV will consider the public policy issues expungement tries to remedy and how 
the majority’s narrow interpretation of expungement requests will go against that intention.9  In 
Part V, the Part V rehabilitative nature of expungement in New Jersey will be highlighted to 
demonstrate that tge majority wrongly interpreted N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2 and erroneously denied 
petitioners’ petitions for expungement.10   
II.  Background/Overview 
In this section the legislative history and background of the relevant New Jersey statutes 
relating to the expungement of criminal records will be discussed together with the facts and 
opinion of In Re Expungement Petition of J.S.  
A. What is Expungement? 
                                                        
5 Id. at 58. 
6 Id. 
7 See infra Part II. 
8 See infra Part III. 
9 See infra Part IV. 
10 See infra Part V. 
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Expungement allows individuals who are convicted of crimes to have their records 
sealed.11 When an individual who has committed a crime has his record expunged, he is given a 
second chance to lead a productive life without the burden of a criminal record. Expungement of 
records is utilized as a means to rehabilitate offenders, who might face difficulty gaining access 
to housing, employment, and in some cases even loans to attend school because of their criminal 
records.12 For example, an individual who has a criminal record that is expunged will not have to 
indicate on an application for employment that he has previously been convicted of a crime.13 
Expungement is rehabilitative in nature and is present in some form in virtually every state in the 
United States.14  In New Jersey, in order to petition for expungement of a criminal record, an 
“eligible” person must file a petition for expungement in the Superior Court, in the county where 
the arrest or prosecution of the crime took place.15 A court proceeding then takes place to 
consider whether or not expungement of the petitioner’s record is appropriate.16 
Expungement is a critical part of the rehabilitative process and the reintegration of an 
offender back into society after he is released. While some may argue that expungement may 
increase the incentive for a first-time offender to commit a crime, in fact expungement acts as a 
deterrent for the individuals who are truly rehabilitated through the criminal justice system.17 
Expungement provides incentives for ex-convicts who wish to reintegrate into society and 
                                                        
11 Paul Bergman, Expunging or Sealing an Adult Criminal Record, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/expungement-of-criminal-records-basics-32641.html (March 25, 2016). 
12 Michael Booth, Christie OKs Measure Easing Expungement, N.J. LAW JOURNAL (Jan. 19, 2016), available at 
http://www.njlawjournal.com/id=1202747403262?keywords=christie+oks+measure+easing+expungement&publicat
ion=New+Jersey+Law+Journal (March 25, 2016). 
13 Bergman, supra note 11. 
14 Id. 
15NEW JERSEY COURTS, How to Expunge Your Criminal and/or Juvenile Record (Nov. 19, 2015), available at 
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/prose/10557_expunge_kit.pdf (March 23, 2016). 
16 Id. 
17 Murat Mungan, Reducing Crime Through Expungements, FSU COLLEGE OF LAW, PUBLIC RESEARCH PAPER NO. 
786, 786, (2016). 
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establish a law-abiding life going forward.18 It is much more important to an ex-convict seeking 
employment to have their record expunged than it would be to a career criminal.19 As such, an 
ex-convict who has had his record expunged is much less likely to commit crime in the future 
because he faces “greater expected informal sanctions [such as losing employment by] 
recidivating.”20 Expungement can be used as a tool to reduce crime through lowering recidivism 
rates.21  
There are two classes of individuals who are most often affected by having a criminal 
record: the young and the indigent.22 Often, indigent individuals are forced to engage in crime in 
order to survive.23 Once convicted, there is even less hope for an indigent person to obtain 
employment than there was prior to the conviction.24 This creates a cycle that involves high 
recidivism rates and leads to more juvenile offenders. If an indigent person is denied access to 
jobs because of a criminal record, he is unable to reconcile his indigent status. It is not 
uncommon for indigent offenders to have children who also may have to turn to crime as a way 
to survive. This sequence could continue for years going forward if individuals are not able to 
have their criminal records expunged and are not given a chance to reintegrate into society as 
rehabilitated individuals.25 
In what way is the rehabilitation of an individual aided by the concealment of his 
criminal record? In order to establish the proposition that expungement rehabilitates an offender, 
the manner in which ex-convicts are treated in American society must be highlighted. If an 
                                                        
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 2. 
20 Id. at 2. 
21 Id. at 2. 
22 Joseph C. Dugan, I Did My Time: The Transformation of Indiana’s Expungement Law, 90 IND L.J.1321, 1326 
(2015). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 1327. 
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known ex-convict obtains employment, he may be subject to lower wages than a similarly 
situated person without a criminal record.26 Also, a known offender may become socially 
isolated from individuals who do not want to be associated with someone they view as a 
criminal.27 An organization known as “Ban the Box” highlights the discrimination with which 
offenders often face when trying to reintegrate into society.28 The organization campaigns for 
removing from applications for employment, insurance, loans, housing and other services, the 
question and “check box” which asks individuals whether or not they have ever been convicted 
by a court.29 The motivation behind banning the box in which offenders would have to identify 
that they have been convicted of a crime is that once this box has been checked “yes”, the 
individuals whom review such applications are likely to either consciously or sub-consciously 
discriminate against the applicant.30 Whether or not you agree with banning the box, 
expungement of a criminal record would provide for similar results to those offenders who the 
court has deemed to be rehabilitated; those offenders would no longer have to “check the box.”  
In conclusion, expungement of an offender’s criminal record allows an individual to be 
rehabilitated back into society. Expungement provides individuals who have been convicted of a 
crime with the opportunity of a fresh start. They no longer have a criminal record preventing 
them from obtaining employment or obtaining access to other social services. There has been 
extensive judicial recognition of the disability a criminal record places upon an individual, and in 
Petition of J.S., the New Jersey Supreme Court could have expanded the concept of 
                                                        
26 Id. at 1328. 
27 Mungan, supra note 17. 
28 BAN THE BOX, http://bantheboxcampaign.org/?p=20#.VvLxz2QrKfR (March 21, 2016). 
29 LEGAL SERVICES FOR PRISONERS WITH CHILDREN, http://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/our-projects/allofus-or-
none/ban-the-box-campaign/ (March 23, 2016). 
30 Ban the Box, supra note 28. 
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expungement and in turn rehabilitate offenders into society; however, the Court instead chose to 
limit those offenders who have access to expungement.31 
B. New Jersey Expungement Statutes 
1. N.J. Stat. § 2C:52-32: How to Construe the Expungement Statute 
N.J. Stat. § 2C:52-32 of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, states that the chapter 
“shall be construed with the primary objective of providing relief to the one-time offender who 
has led a life of rectitude and disassociated himself with unlawful activity, but not to create a 
system whereby periodic violators of the law or those who associate themselves with criminal 
activity have a regular means of expunging their police and criminal records.”32  Chapter 52 is 
solely concerned with New Jersey’s expungement of criminal records.33  
2. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a): The Mechanism of Expungement 
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) is the New Jersey statute that relates to the expungement of criminal 
records.34 It authorizes the expungement of the records of “certain criminal convictions.”35  The 
pertinent language of the statute reads as follows: 
In all cases, except as herein provided, wherein a person has been 
convicted of a crime under the laws of this State and who has not 
been convicted of any prior or subsequent crime, whether within this 
State or any other jurisdiction, and has not been adjudged a disorderly 
person or petty disorderly person on more than two occasions may, 
after the expiration of a period of [ten] years from the date of his 
conviction, payment of fine, satisfactory completion of probation or 
parole, or release from incarceration, whichever is later, present a 
duly verified petition as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-7 to the Superior 
Court in the county in which the conviction was entered praying that 
                                                        
31 See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 519 (1954) (Minton, J., dissenting) (writing that a record of a 
conviction is a “lifelong handicap … [that] may at any time threaten [someone’s] social standing or affect his job 
opportunities”). 
32 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-32. 
33 Id. 
34 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-2(a). 
35 Id. 
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such conviction and all records and information pertaining thereto be 
expunged.36 
 
Prior to 1979, the New Jersey expungement statute stated that in criminal cases where a 
person has “no subsequent conviction,” that individual could petition for expungement ten years 
from the date of such a conviction.37 In 1979, the statute was amended to change the language 
from “subsequent conviction” to “any prior or subsequent crime,” a change that the majority of 
the New Jersey Supreme Court would strongly rely upon in subsequent argument interpreting 
this statute.38 Prior to the 1979 amendment, offenders who had been subsequently convicted 
could apply for an expungement under the language of the previous statute.39 After the 1979 
amendment, only offenders who had participated in a “prior or subsequent crime” could apply 
for expungement of their records.40 This amendment narrowed the availability of expungement 
to offenders. Previously, any offender who had a prior conviction could ask the court to consider 
their petition. A conviction is defined as the result of a criminal trial in which an individual is 
guilty as charged.41 Nothing was said about the number of crimes of which an individual had to 
be convicted, it was simply stated that a person had to have been previously convicted. After the 
1979 amendment, only individuals who had participated in any prior or subsequent “crime” 
could apply. The amendment used the singular form of crime, therefore limiting the access of 
expungement to individuals who had participated in a single crime, rather than those who had a 
single conviction. The 1979 amendment was enacted three years after In re Fontana, a case that 
will be discussed at length later on in this note. 
                                                        
36 Id. 
37 In re Fontana, 146 N.J. Super. 264, 266 (App. Div. 1976) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:164-28). 
38 Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. at 58. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Black's Law Dictionary 384 (9th ed. 2009). 
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In 2010 the statute was amended again to add two provisions, the first of which provided 
that expungement could be requested after five years had passed since the offender was 
convicted.  If the petitioner establishes a “compelling interest,” he can obtain expungement prior 
to the ordinary ten-year time period.42 A “compelling interest” may be established in special 
circumstances including satisfactory completion of probation or release from prison, or if the 
court “finds in its discretion that expungement is in the public interest.”43 The statute instructs 
the court the factors to consider when determining whether expungement is in the public interest: 
the nature of the offense, and the applicant’s character and conduct since conviction.44   
In addition to the “compelling interest” prong, a “public interest” prong was also added in 
2010. The public interest prong allowed for expungement of a criminal record if the following 
circumstances existed: “passage of five years[,] no additional convictions[,] and a finding that 
expungement is in the public interest.”45  In Petition of J.S., the majority determined that the 
2010 amendments demonstrated that the legislature “intended the statute to ‘provid[e] relief to 
the one-time offender who has led a life of rectitude and disassociated himself with unlawful 
activity[.]’”46 
C.  Summary of In re Expungement Petition of J.S. 
In Petition of J.S., petitions to expunge the criminal records of J.S. and G.P.B. were heard in 
a case consolidated by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  At the trial level, the Superior Court 
granted both petitioners’ request for expungement. The state appealed both decisions of the 
Superior Court to the Appellate Division.47  The Appellate Division reversed both petitioners’ 
                                                        
42 Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. at 68.  
43 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-2(a)(2). 
44 Id.  
45 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-2(a)(2). 
46 In re Expungement Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. 54 (2015) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-32). 
47 In re G.P.B., 436 N.J. Super. 48, 50 (App. Div. 2014). 
    In re Expungement Petition of J.S., 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2087 (App. Div. Aug. 22, 2013). 
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grants of expungement and the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification to hear the 
petitioners’ appeals.48  
1. In the Matter of the Expungement Petition of J.S. 
J.S., a former New Jersey resident, was arrested twice for selling marijuana to an 
undercover police officer.49  He was arrested two times in a five-day period and charged with 
nine offenses.50  All of his charges were heard on the same date during a single trial 
proceeding.51  He was sentenced to a three-year term of probation for third and fourth degree 
distribution charges.52  Five years after completing probation, he filed a petition for 
expungement.53  
The trial court granted J.S.’s petition for expungement reasoning that his two offenses 
were committed under a “single spree.”54  The term “single spree” emanates from In re Fontana, 
a case that will be discussed at length later on in this note.55 The Appellate Division reasoned 
that if two crimes were committed in a “single spree” those “offenses constituted a solitary 
crime” when it decided In re Fontana.56 The Appellate Division overruled the lower court’s 
ruling of In re Ross, which will also be discussed at length later on in the analysis.57  Under Ross, 
the Appellate Division ruled that the crimes committed by J.S. were “prior or subsequent” to 
                                                        
48 In re Expungement Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. 54 (2015); In re Expungement Petition of G.P.B., 219 N.J. 620 
(2014). 
49 Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. at 60. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. at 61. 
54 Id. (citing In re Fontana, 146 N.J. Super. 117 (App. Div. 2008)).  
55 In re Fontana, 146 N.J. Super. 264 (App. Div. 1976); see supra Part III. 
56 Id. 
57 In re Ross, 400 N.J. Super. 117 (App. Div. 2008).; see supra Part III. 
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each other and therefore, because expungement is only permitted for one “crime,” it could not be 
permitted.58  
2. In the Matter of the Expungement of the Criminal Records of G.P.B. 
G.P.B. is a New Jersey resident who committed several offenses in furtherance of a 
conspiracy.59 These offenses included one count of conspiring to offer gifts to a public official 
and three counts of offering gifts to a public servant. The conspiracy involved offering gifts to 
local officials of a specific municipality in order to promote his business.60  G.P.B. pled guilty to 
four offenses heard at one trial where he ultimately was sentenced to thirty days at a corrections 
facility, 100 hours of community service and a fine.61  G.P.B. petitioned for expungement ten 
years after his convictions.62  
The trial court granted his petition under the belief that all of his crimes constituted a 
continuing conspiracy and could therefore be linked together as “one ‘crime’” under N.J.S.A. 
2C:52-2(a).63  The Appellate Division reversed this decision because the four offenses G.P.B. 
committed occurred over the course of two days.64  The Appellate Division believed that since 
the offenses did not occur at the same time, they could not be labeled under the same “crime,” 
and therefore were not eligible for expungement.65 
3. Consolidation and In re Expungement Petition of J.S. 
Both J.S. and G.P.B. appealed the Appellate Division’s reversal of the trial courts’ grant 
of expungement.  On petitioners’ appeals, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the issue of 
                                                        
58 Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. at 62. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 In re G.P.B., 436 N.J. Super. 48, 52 (App. Div. 2014). 
65 Id. 
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whether the statutory language of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2 “bars expungement of convictions of a 
defendant who pleads guilty in a single proceeding to multiple offenses … committed within a 
short period of time.”66  The majority reasoned that the legislature, when enacting N.J.S.A. 
2C:52-2, desired to limit expungement “to offenders who have committed no more than an 
isolated infraction in an otherwise law-abiding life.”67  As such, it ruled that the “plain language” 
of the statute precluded the “expungement of convictions when the petitioner has been convicted 
of multiple crimes, even when those crimes occurred within a short span of time.”68 
Relying heavily on In re Ross, a 2008 Appellate Division case in which the “one-night 
spree” reasoning of In re Fontana was rejected when applied to the expungement statute, the 
majority denied petitioners’ expungement petitions.69  The “one-night spree” terminology had 
originally been used by the trial court to rationalize expungement of J.S. and G.P.B.’s records.70 
The concept of the “one-night spree” came from In re Fontana, a 1976 New Jersey Appellate 
Division case.71  
The majority used the analysis of the language of the statute to buttress their position that 
the legislature’s intent when enacting the statute was to “bar expungement when the offender has 
committed a second crime … whether or not those crimes [we]re resolved in the same judgment 
of conviction.”72 On the other hand, the dissent relied upon a public policy argument to support 
its contention that the expungement statute should be more liberally construed.73  Justice 
LaVecchia believed that “the statutory language does not plainly support the approach chosen by 
                                                        
66 Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. at 58. 
67 Id. at 66. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 62. 
70 Id. at 61. 
71 Id. at 61. 
72 In re Expungement Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. 54, 75 (2015) (LaVecchia, J., dissenting). 
73 Id. at 78 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting). 
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the majority.”74  Rather, Justice LaVecchia read the ambiguous nature of the language of the 
statute to permit a more liberal construction, which would better further the rehabilitative nature 
of the legislation.75   
III.  Rehabilitation of Offenders and the Need for Liberal Construction of an 
Expungement Statute  
 The majority’s decision in Petition of J.S. is contrary to New Jersey jurisprudence 
promoting the rehabilitation of offenders through a narrow construction of the expungement 
statute. Past cases decided by the New Jersey courts relating to petitions for expungement of 
criminal records will be discussed, as well as New Jersey’s approach to jurisprudence regarding 
the expungement statute.  This section will also discuss the manner in which the New Jersey 
courts have used crime as a capacious term, encompassing offenses and convictions under the 
same heading.  
A. Standard of Review 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the trial and appellate court’s decisions 
interpreting N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) de novo.76  The New Jersey Supreme Court looked to the 
legislative intent of the statute by analyzing the plain language and applying those words in the 
context of expungement in “a way that would not produce an absurd result.”77  The majority felt 
that if the legislature wanted expungement to be available “to offenders such as petitioners, 
convicted of multiple crimes that occurred in close succession … not concurrently, it may 
amend” the statute to demonstrate that intent.78  Alternatively, the dissent interpreted the statute 
                                                        
74 Id. at 79 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting). 
75 Id. (LaVecchia, J., dissenting). 
76 Id. at 54. 
77 In re Expungement Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. 54 (2015). 
78 Id. at 58.  
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as allowing expungement of an “indictable offense or offenses when a person has not been 
convicted of a crime prior or subsequent to the judgment … he seeks to expunge … [t]he 
judgment … may contain multiple counts … he or she is a ‘one-time offender.’”79 
B. The “Single Spree” and In re Fontana 
In 1976, Fontana was charged in six different indictments relating to charges of larceny 
and breaking and entering.80  Thirteen years after being convicted, Fontana petitioned for 
expungement of his record under N.J.S.A. 2A:164-28, which would later be repealed in 1979.81  
The statute under which Fontana was ultimately granted expungement stated:  
“in all cases wherein a criminal conviction has been entered 
against any person whereon sentence was suspended … and 
no subsequent conviction has been entered against such 
person, it shall be lawful after the lapse of ten years from the 
date of such conviction for the person so convicted to present 
a duly verified petition to the Court, wherein such conviction 
was entered, setting forth all the facts in the matter and 
praying for the relief provided in this section.”82 
 
 
The trial court judge denied Fontana’s petition because he did not feel that the statute 
gave him the authority to expunge more then one conviction and Fontana had been convicted of 
six offenses.83  On appeal, the Appellate Division allowed the expungement of Fontana’s record 
because “the crimes which form the basis of the convictions … were committed within a 
comparatively short time.”84 The Appellate Division noted in its decision that the judgments of 
all of Fontana’s convictions were entered on the same day.85  As such, the Appellate Division 
                                                        
79 Id. at 83 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-2(a)). 
80 In re Fontana, 146 N.J. Super. 264, 266 (App. Div. 1976). 
81 Id.  
82 Fontana, 146 N.J. Super. at 266 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:164-28). 
83 Id. at 267. 
84 Id. (citing State v. McBride, 127 N.J. Super 399 (App. Div. 1974), aff’d 66 N.J. 577 (1975)).  
85 Id. 
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believed that Fontana’s criminal activity could be viewed as occurring in a “one-night spree.”86 
In their decision, the Appellate Division chose to give “special consideration” to Fontana’s 
expungement request, which they believed they had the ability to do given the discretionary 
nature of the statute.87 
Three years after In re Fontana was decided, the New Jersey legislature repealed the statute 
under which it had been decided. The current expungement statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2 was 
amended that same year.88  The majority in Petition of J.S. stated that because the Legislature 
chose not to amend the statute in 1979 to reflect the Fontana decision, the majority should view 
that as an indication of the Legislature’s dissatisfaction with the Fontana decision.89  “The 
Legislature that enacted N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2 is presumed to have been aware of the judicial 
construction of the expungement statute’s earlier version.”90 This is misguided. Rather, it is more 
likely that the New Jersey Legislature did not enact such an addendum to its amendment of the 
expungement statute because the Legislature felt it unnecessary given the result of In re Fontana.  
The dissent articulated this belief in its opinion stating that rather than the majority’s approach 
that the legislature, in failing to amend the statute to conform to Fontana, evidenced the 
legislature’s dissatisfaction with the decision, the absence of any mention of Fontana’s 
principles demonstrated that the Legislature did not intend to eliminate the “Fontana approach 
[of] a one-time spree.”91  
In the Petition of J.S., the dissent addresses the Legislature’s exclusion of Fontana, and 
notes that if the Legislature actually disapproved of Fontana, that the “one-night spree” would be 
                                                        
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. at 58. 
89 Id. at 75. 
90 Id. at 75. 
91 Id. at 85 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting).  
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specifically noted as something not to be allowed in expungement petitions.92 Essentially, if the 
Legislature wanted to overrule Fontana, as the majority implied, there could have been an 
explicit provision written into the statute to state that expungement could only be granted to 
petitioners who were convicted of a single crime during one single event. 
C. In re Kollman 
In 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the denial of an application for 
expungement when it decided In re Kollman.93  In that case, the petitioner had been indicted on 
three counts of selling drugs on three separate occasions.  The petitioner was permitted to plead 
guilty to one count under his plea deal.94  Ten years after he was convicted, Kollman petitioned 
for expungement of his record, offering proof that he had since finished college, participated in 
the community and worked full-time, in addition to the fact that he had not been subsequently 
arrested.95 
The trial court denied Kollman’s request because the judge believed it went against the 
public’s best interest to hide Kollman’s conviction and the Appellate Division confirmed.96  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the appellate and trial courts’ denial of Kollman’s petition 
for expungement.  The Court noted that the purpose of the expungement statute was “to give a 
second chance to one-time offenders convicted of less serious offenses who have led law-abiding 
lives since conviction[.]”97  In the decision, the Court noted “Kollman has led an exemplary and 
law-abiding life since his conviction, which weighs heavily in favor of expungement.” 
                                                        
92 Id.  
93 In re Kollman, 210 N.J. 557 (2012). 
94 Id. at 562. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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In Kollman, the Court articulated what they felt was the Legislature’s intent when it 
amended N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32.  The Court believed that the Legislature intended for the statute to 
be “construed with the primary objective of providing relief to the one-time offender who has led 
a life of rectitude and disassociated himself with unlawful activity[.]”98  The Court also 
articulated the factors a court should consider when determining whether expungement is in the 
best interest of “public interest.”  The statutory language states that expungement can be allowed 
if “the court finds in its discretion that expungement is in the public interest, giving due 
consideration to the nature of the offense, and the applicant’s character and conduct since 
conviction.”99  The Court felt that a “fact-specific inquiry” needed to be considered for each 
expungement petition in order to determine if a petitioner reaches eligibility for expungement.100  
The individual petitioning for expungement bears the burden to prove he has satisfied these 
elements.101  
In Kollman, the petitioner demonstrated he had been an active member of the community 
who held a steady job and completed a college degree since being convicted of his crime.102  In 
Petition of J.S., J.S. provided similar evidence yet his claim is unable to be heard on the merits 
because of the majority’s decision.103 This is just one example of the manner in which the 
majority’s limitation of the expungement statute has hindered an individual’s ability to be heard 
by the court for an expungement petition that could potentially be awarded on its merits. 
D. In re Ross 
                                                        
98 Id. at 568 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-32). 
99 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-2(a)(2). 
100 Kollman, 210 N.J. at 575. 
101 Id. at 573.  
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103 Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. at 63. 
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The majority’s decision in Petition of J.S.  “follows the path set down by the Appellate 
Division in In re Ross, but it is not a path that is compelled.”104 The Ross decision was handed 
down in 2008, prior to the 2010 amendment of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2.  The dissent in Petition of J.S. 
argued that “when it enacted N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2, [the] Legislature ‘deliberately chose to alter the 
more expansive view of expungement that had existed under N.J.S.A. 2A:164-28 and that was 
exemplified by [the] decision in Fontana.’”105  The dissent’s argument is that if the Legislature 
had intended for the expungement statute to be construed under Ross as the majority wrote, it 
would have amended the statute accordingly in the 2010 amendment.106  
The Appellate Division determined that “the words ‘prior’ and ‘subsequent’ modify the 
term ‘crime,’ not the term ‘conviction’” when they decided In re Ross.107  The modification of 
the term “crime … leads to the conclusion that if two crimes are committed on separate 
occasions, they are precluded from expungement regardless of whether the two crimes carry a 
single sentencing date and there-fore a single date of conviction.108  Ross committed his crimes 
“months” apart and therefore was ineligible for expungement of his record.109  Ross argued that 
since his convictions were entered on the same day under the same proceeding that his 
conviction for battery could be expunged.110  His other conviction, false swearing, was ineligible 
for expungement under the New Jersey Statute.111  
Similarly to what the majority believed with respect to the Legislature’s amendment of 
the expungement statute after In re Fontana, the dissent believes that if the Legislature had 
                                                        
104 Id. at 86 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting). 
105 Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. at 75 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting) (citing In re Ross, 400 N.J. Super. 117, 123-24 (App. 
Div. 2008)). 
106 Id. (LaVecchia, J., dissenting). 
107 Id. (citing In re Ross, 400 N.J. Super. 117, 120-24 (App. Div. 2008)). 
108 In re Ross, 400 N.J. Super. 117, 122 (App. Div. 2008). 
109 Id. at 119. 
110 Id. at 121. 
111 Id. at 120.  
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intended to codify the decision of In re Ross, the Legislature would have articulated such intent 
in the revision of the statute. 
E. Conflicting Use of the Terms “Crime” and “Offense” in the Jurisprudence of New 
Jersey Courts 
1.  Prosecutorial Discretion 
The dissent in Petition of J.S. noted that prosecutorial discretion plays a major factor in 
whether or not an offender will be able to apply for expungement of his record.112  For example, 
if a prosecutor permits an offender to make a plea deal, the nature of that deal will determine 
whether or not an offender can later expunge his record; this is demonstrated by In re 
Kollman.113   
When an offender is arrested and placed on trial for a crime, the prosecutor has the 
discretion to determine what crime or crimes with which to charge the individual. Under the 
majority’s construction of the expungement statute in New Jersey, if a prosecutor decides to 
charge an individual found selling drugs to two individuals with one count of selling drugs, that 
individual will be able to apply for expungement after the requisite time period has passed.114 On 
the other hand, if that same offender committed the same crime in a different county, another 
prosecutor might decide to charge the offender with two counts of selling drugs, which would 
then mean the individual will be unable to apply for expungement.115 This creates an inequity, 
which the dissent in Petition of J.S. believes “is not clearly indicated from the plain language of 
the statute.”116 
                                                        
112 Revise the NJ Expungement Statute, N.J. LAW JOURNAL (Aug. 21, 2015), 
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The Petition of J.S. majority wrote that the legislature, in their construction of the 
expungement statutes, has attempted to limit expungement to those offenders who have been 
convicted of “no more than an isolated infraction in an otherwise law-abiding life.”117 An 
isolated infraction does not have to mean one single offense. G.P.B. plead to four offenses, 
which were all committed to further a single conspiracy.118 In fact, G.P.B. was charged with 
three counts of the same crime during trial and his ultimate conviction.119 On appeal, G.P.B. 
argued that any overt acts relating to that single conspiracy should be considered under the 
heading of a single crime.120 The majority disagreed with G.P.B’s contention that offenses 
relating to a single conspiracy constituted a single “crime.”  
The dissent, on the other hand, believed that a “single criminal transaction can give rise 
to multiple counts.”121  The dissenters cited Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “separate 
offense” as including "[a]n offense arising out of a different event entirely from another offense 
under consideration.”122  The ambiguity raised by the phrase “prior or subsequent crime” makes 
it difficult to justify the majority’s narrow reading of a rehabilitative statute such as the 
expungement statute.123  
2.  When an Event Constitutes an Offense vs. When an Event Constitutes a Crime 
In 1983, the New Jersey Appellate Division decided State v. A.N.J. The Appellate 
Division found that even though A.N.J. had been convicted of a disorderly persons conviction 
after already committing two similar convictions, his record could be expunged.124 The statute 
                                                        
117 Id. at 66.  
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 In re Expungement Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. 54, 65 (2015). 
121 Id. at 81 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting). 
122 Id. (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1188 (9th ed. 2009)). 
123 Id. 
124 State v. A.N.J., 192 N.J. Super. 350, 353 (App. Div. 1983). 
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that was applied in A.N.J. was N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32.125 The court wrote that “[n]otwithstanding the 
language of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32, the legislature surely has not restricted 
the expungement opportunity to the ‘one-time offender.’”126 N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32 provides that the 
system of expungement in New Jersey is not meant to “create a system whereby periodic 
violators of the law … have a [] means of expunging their … records.”127  
State v. A.N.J. is distinguishable from Petition of J.S. because in A.N.J., the offender was 
not convicted of a “crime,” but rather, he was convicted of a disorderly offense.128 The Appellate 
Division in State v. A.N.J. noted in their decision, “disorderly persons offenses are not 
crimes.”129 Under N.J.S.A. § 2C:1-4, an offense becomes a crime once it is accompanied by an 
authorization of imprisonment in excess of six months.130 Disorderly offenses are not considered 
crimes because there is no right to trial on those offenses and they do not carry any imprisonment 
in excess of six months.131 Even though disorderly persons offenses are not considered crimes, 
they are still classified as “2C” criminal offenses under New Jersey Law.132 
On appeal from the trial judge’s dismissal of his expungement petition, the Appellate 
Division ruled that a conviction for a crime could be expunged even though an individual had 
previously committed a disorderly persons offense.133 Similarly, a disorderly persons offense can 
be expunged even if two prior convictions occurred.134 On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, the Court upheld the Appellate Division’s decision to grant A.N.J.’s expungement.135  
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In State v. A.N.J., the New Jersey Supreme Court liberally construed an expungement 
statute, a statute related to disorderly persons offenses. The Court could have decided to 
narrowly construe the statute and only allow individuals with one disorderly persons offense to 
have their records expunged, but that is not what they chose to do. Rather, the Court allowed 
offenders who had committed multiple offenses to have their records expunged. The only 
difference between the facts of A.N.J. and those of J.S. and G.P.B. is the type of offense 
committed. If J.S. and G.P.B. had been convicted of committing two or three disorderly persons 
offenses, their records may have been eligible for expungement.  
IV.  Public Policy: Access to Expungement and Rehabilitation of Offenders 
The New Jersey Legislature, in its discussion about the rehabilitation of offenders, found 
that it is in the public interest for the Legislature and the courts to do what they can to 
rehabilitate convicted offenders.136 The Legislature intended to do this by “removing all 
impediments and restrictions” to the opportunity for convicted offenders to obtain employment 
or participate in programs they may be hindered from joining solely on the basis of a criminal 
record.137 In the In re Kollman opinion, the Court reasoned that the legislature amended the 
expungement statute in 2010 to “[t]o promote employability.”138 The majority’s decision in 
Petition of J.S. limits the legislature’s intention to promote rehabilitation and employability of 
offenders. By limiting the number of offenders who are able to have their criminal records 
expunged, the majority is limiting the number of offenders who will be able to be fairly 
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employed and rehabilitated into society. Remedial legislation is “deserving of liberal 
construction.”139   
  It is well known that millions of adults have criminal records. Those records affect those 
offenders’ reentry into society after incarceration.140 “Criminal records can present barriers to 
employment, licensing, and housing, among other things.”141 Expungement is a way to “provide 
relief from a conviction's onerous collateral life-long consequences.”142 That is why 
expungement is so important to society and it is crucial that it be broadly construed in order to 
further its remedial purpose.  
As set forth in Part II of this note, the expungement statute was amended in 2010.  This 
amendment was a result of a “series of recommendations by the Executive Branch in 2007.”143  
The Governor's Office recommended “modifying the expungement statute ‘to promote 
employability’ of rehabilitated ex-offenders, including ‘allowing first offenders to seek 
expungement in a wider variety of cases’ and ‘reducing the time frame requirements for 
compelling cases.’"144   
The dissent in Petition of J.S. disagreed with the majority’s argument that allowing 
expungement for petitioners such as J.S. and G.P.B. was contrary to protecting the public 
interest.145 The dissent acknowledged the majority’s concern about protecting the public interest 
                                                        
139 Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. at 81 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting) (citing Maglies v. Estate of Guy, 193 N.J. 108, 123 
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but rebutted that concern by noting that “the public interest is fully protected by the layers of 
review that can support denial of an expungement application.”146 What the majority has done by 
limiting those offenders who can petition for expungement is to diminish the potential for an 
offender to fully rehabilitate back into society. Rather, what they should have done is rely on the 
safeguards in place to protect the public interest that are built in to the expungement process, 
New Jersey’s court system. When an individual petitions for expungement, it is the trial judge, 
who then decides to either grant or deny that petition.147 The trial judge considers the individual 
and the evidence of rehabilitation since committing their crime, if that exists.148 Safeguards also 
exist in the statute itself, “for example, … expungement cannot be obtained for many serious 
crimes or when [t]he need for the availability of the records outweighs the desirability of having 
a person freed from any disabilities."  A court evaluating a petition for expungement has the 
discretion to “evaluate the person, the nature of his offense and his conduct since his 
conviction.”149 
When a court decides to expunge an offender’s criminal record, one of the factors 
considered is whether or not expungement is in the public interest.150 They do this by considering 
both the nature of the offense and  whether the need for the availability of records outweighs the 
desirability of expungement.”151  “In practice, trial judges will balance the [] factors as they 
decide whether expungement serves the public interest in a particular case.  In doing so, they 
weigh the risks and benefits to the public of allowing or barring expungement.”152 
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A. Bill A206: An Expansion of Expungement after In re Expungement Petition of J.S. 
On January 19, 2016, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed new expungement 
legislation into law.153  Bill A206 is intended to facilitate the expungement of criminal records.154  
Upon taking effect, the bill will  “reduce the waiting period for expungement from [ten] years to 
five years.”  For convictions such as a disorderly persons offense, where the wait period for 
expungement is currently five years before an offender can apply, the offender will now only 
have to wait three years.155  Under this new bill, offenders can apply for expungement either 
three or five years after their “most recent conviction … for that crime.”156 
Assemblyman Jerry Green of Union was a primary sponsor of Bill A206.157  After the bill 
received legislative approval in September 2015, Assemblyman Green spoke about the impact 
the bill will have on New Jersey offenders, stating “expungement offers an incentive against 
recidivism.  It gives people who currently have little chance of finding … employment the 
opportunity to leave past mistakes behind them, find a job and be productive.”158  
Assemblywoman L. Grace Spencer of Essex was a primary supporter of the bill.159  When 
discussing her motivation for supporting this bill, Spencer said that she felt that many offenders 
feel the heavy burden of a criminal record for the rest of their lives.160  Spencer viewed a 
criminal record as a roadblock for offenders who were trying to reintegrate into society. 
 In addition to lessening the wait period for offenders to be eligible to apply for 
expungement of their criminal record, A206 will also allow expungement of “criminal 
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conviction records for certain people who have … a sentence of special probation in Drug 
Court.”161  This is a significant expansion of the class of individuals who shall be able to apply 
for expungement of their records. The New Jersey Legislature and Governor Christie appear to 
be doing what they can to broaden the availability of expungement to offenders.  In fact, a 
companion bill to A206, A1662, similarly expands the class of individuals who can apply for 
expungement.162  Bill A1662 allows a judge to expunge the record of an identity theft victim 
charged with a crime caused by the person responsible for the theft.163  In that case, the identity 
theft victim does not have to wait for any period of time in order to apply for expungement.164  
 Bill A206 was signed into law by Governor Christie a little over four months after the 
New Jersey Supreme Court decided Petition of J.S., less than four months after the Court decided 
to limit the people who could apply for expungement under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a), Governor 
Christie expanded the group of people who could apply for expungement of their criminal 
records. This bill demonstrates the desire of New Jersey’s government to rehabilitate and 
reintegrate offenders back into society by widening the scope of those individuals who may 
apply for an expungement.  
B. A Three-Year Follow-Up on New Jersey’s Offenders 
 A study of recidivism rates in New Jersey was conducted by the Department of 
Corrections in 2010 in the form of a three-year “follow-up.” In 2010, 11,388 inmates were 
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released from jail.165 Forty-four percent did not have a prior history of incarceration.166 In fact, 
fifty-six percent of the individuals had no prior criminal history.167 That means, of 11,388 
inmates released, approximately 6,378 of those inmates were in jail for their first offense. Of the 
overall sample taken, about fifty-three percent of the inmates had been re-arrested by the time 
follow-up took place.168 Of those fifty-three percent who were re-arrested, forty-two percent 
were re-convicted and thirty-two percent were re-incarcerated.169 These percentages have 
remained pretty steady since the three-year follow-ups began in 2007.170 The follow-up looked 
into both juvenile and adult offenders. Of the total number, approximately sixty-eight percent of 
offenders had not returned to prison within the conclusion of the three-year follow-up.171 In the 
report the position was taken that offenders who had not been re-incarcerated had likely 
“returned to their communities are productive citizens.”172 There is no statistic in the report 
regarding the number of these offenders who are or will become eligible for expungement.  
V.  Conclusion 
 
The United States is known by many for its imprisonment of a “greater proportion of its 
population than any other country.”173 Although the United States may be known for its high 
incarceration rate, the current trend throughout the country is to rehabilitate offenders and 
reintegrate them back into society. Expungement is a means to accomplish this goal. 
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Expungement serves “to eliminate the collateral consequences imposed upon otherwise law-
abiding citizens who have had a minor brush with the criminal justice system.’”174  In New 
Jersey, expungement was made more difficult by the Supreme Court’s decision in Petition of 
J.S.. This decision is contrary to the trend in New Jersey, as mentioned previously in Part IV of 
this note, in which lawmakers are campaigning for bills that would expand the expungement 
statute. Bill A206, signed into law by Governor Christie of New Jersey is an example of such 
legislation.  
In order to reduce the prison population, it is crucial for New Jersey’s offenders to be 
given the opportunity to reintegrate back into society. As seen above, when given the opportunity 
to return to their communities as “productive citizens,” offenders are simply not being re-
incarcerated.175  These offenders are enabled to return to their communities, as law-abiding, 
productive citizens, through expungement.  The expungement statute needs to be liberally 
construed in order to provide the State of New Jersey with the opportunity to execute its purpose: 
rehabilitating New Jersey’s offenders. 
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